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nednobbins
The US has specific sanctions against Ramzan Kadyrov and if Musk violated any of them he could be prosecuted for sanctions violations.
That would be separate from a prosecution under “succor to the enemy”. As near as I can tell, that only comes into effect under the very specific case of declared wars and that sanctions alone, aren’t sufficient.
You’re right. They’re not LLMs and they’re not particularly new.
The main new part is that new techniques in AI and better hardware means that we can get better answers than we used to be able to get. Many people also realize that there’s a lot of potential to develop systems that are much better at answering those questions.
So when people ask, “Why are companies investing in AI when customers hate AI.” Part of the answer is that they’re investing in something different than what most people think of when they hear “AI”.
Article III, Section 3, Clause 1 says:
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
It’s a fairly narrow definition. I haven’t found any cases where the USSC defines “enemy” but, given the preceding sentence, it looks like the heavily implied definition is, “Members of a nation that is at war with the United States.”
Officially, the US has only been at war 5 times. The last one was WW II.
A lot of people have come to realize that LLMs and generative AI aren’t what they thought it was. They’re not electric brains that are reasonable replacements for humans. They get really annoyed at the idea of a company trying to do that.
Some companies are just dumb and want to do it anyway because they misread their customers.
Some companies know their customer hate it but their research shows that they’ll still make more money doing it.
Many people that are actually working with AI realize that AI is great for a much larger set of problems. Many of those problems are worth a ton of money; (eg. monitoring biometric data to predict health risks earlier, natural disaster prediction and fraud detection).
I think that still boils down to attrition and relative size.
From what I’ve seen. Russia has only pulled small numbers of troops out of other theaters to reinforce Kursk. They’ve had an ongoing assault on Avdiivka and they don’t seem to have pulled enough troops out of there to slow down the assault.
The impact, both the severity of the impact and the duration of the impact is likely to hinge on how deep Russias reserves are and their overall production capacity. As near as I can tell, they have both in spades.
From what I’ve seen on Russian industrial production they don’t really care too much if all of Kursk were destroyed. It’s not a strategic location (I think) and all the human and material resources can be easily and quickly replaced.
That obviously involves a lot of guesswork on my part. That’s why I’m wondering if someone with expertise just knows the answers to these kinds of questions (and would hopefully also provide sources).
If that’s the case then Ukraine would need to repeat the Kursk invasion a lot before it made a difference.
Trying to out attrit an opponent with many times the population and GDP is a pretty tall order.
I’m trying to differentiate between things we might like and things that are actually likely.
That makes sense. I’d have questions about all of those too
a) be intended to divide Russian attention and spread their forces out Do we know if that’s happening? Russia has a lot of people and equipment and it’s not obvious to me that they need to pull many resources from other fronts to reinforce Kursk.
b) be used in negotiation and applying domestic pressure to Putin That would make sense too. As long as Ukraine is still holding that territory when those negotiations are going on. Are there any estimates on when those negotiations could happen and if Ukraine will still be in control of Kursk by then?
c) provide a greater buffer for air-defense to counter inbound artillery and missiles
That true but only in the areas directly near Kursk. Is it likely that this can be repeated along the rest of the battle lines?
Your intuition on what Ukraine is hoping to achieve seems reasonable but I don’t know if it’s likely to work out that way.
The whole thing makes me think back to the “Ukrainian counteroffensive” from last year. At the time, US advisors were telling them to do a fast combined arms assault on some place like Mariupol, instead of dithering around, letting the Russians build a ton of defenses and then smashing all the fancy US equipment against said defenses. This assault seems almost like what that counteroffensive should have been. I say “almost” because I’m puzzled about the target. Controlling Mariupol would have cut off the entire western half of the Russian assault. They’d have no supplies and nowhere to run to besides going for a swim. Kursk? The benefits are less obvious.