Don’t forget all of this was discovered because ssh was running 0.5 seconds slower
I have been reading about this since the news broke and still can’t fully wrap my head around how it works. What an impressive level of sophistication.
And due to open source, it was still caught within a month. Nothing could ever convince me more than that how secure FOSS can be.
Idk if that’s the right takeaway, more like ‘oh shit there’s probably many of these long con contributors out there, and we just happened to catch this one because it was a little sloppy due to the 0.5s thing’
This shit got merged. Binary blobs and hex digit replacements. Into low level code that many things use. Just imagine how often there’s no oversight at all
Any additional information been found on the user?
as long as you’re up to date on everything here: https://boehs.org/node/everything-i-know-about-the-xz-backdoor
the only additional thing i’ve seen noted is a possibilty that they were using Arch based on investigation of the tarball that they provided to distro maintainers
The tukaani github repos are gone, is there a mirror somewhere?
Though unfortunately (or I guess for most use-cases fortunately) you can’t find the malicious m4/build-to-host.m4 file on there afaik. The best way to find that now, should you really want to, is by looking through the commit history of the salsa.debian.org/debian/xz-utils repository which is, as far as I understand it, the repository that the debian packages are built from and consequently also what the compromised packages were built from.
In a nutshell you say…