Not sure if this is the correct place to post, but I just wanna kinda rant a bit.
I’m not the only one that hates this, right?
An app can just do a “This App Does Not Allow Screenshots”? Like… wtf?
Like, its my phone, and some app can just decide to disable a fuction of my phone. It’s my phone and if I wanna take a screenshot, I’m taking a screenshot. I don’t care about whatever “security” the app developer wants.
Imagine if every online shopping app whether fast food or amazon, just used this to block you from taking a screenshot so you can’t save the records in case of a dispute.
Which android developer thought it was a good idea to let an app disable a function on your phone. Even iPhone doesn’t have this stupid concept.
Sorry for the rant.
Anyone wanna share your stories?
(P.S. I have a cheap secondary phone to take photos of the screen. “This App Does Not Allow Screenshots” my ass lmao, I’m taking the screenshot whether the app wants it or not.
What on earth are those in charge of certification standards thinking they’ll achieve with requirements like this?
Accidentally screenshotting your bank acct and routing number is the only one I can really think of.
Or your “time clock earth sounds” app from the not so well policed appstore takes silent background screenshots, grayscales them and sends them to their host for OCR.
I agree this permission is annoying. But I differ in I feel it should be system controlled and can be invoked by apps that identify specific fields to be blocked, instead ofnjusy disabling it outright.
The same functionality that you use to take screenshots can be hijacked by bad actors to get access to your stuff. It’s especially bad if they can see your MFA apps or other sensitive info.
Not saying the functionality is always used for the best of intentions, but there are many situations where I see it as necessary.
It’s probably to stop third party apps from screenshoting the banking app.
Why is this only a problem on mobile? Why doesn’t desktop have similar requirements?
tbh the security settings on desktop devices tend to be more lax in general; for example almost any desktop pc has an open bootloader, means you can sideload an operating system from usb. The consequence is that no password-at-login will protect your private data; only full disk encryption can.
Smartphones on the other hand often have a fully-locked bootloader, which means it’s totally non-trivial to install an alternative operating system. especially, it often contains wiping any data on the smartphone, so an attacker with access to the device can’t simply install their own OS and read the internal storage.
